Denver Law Review
Volume 43
Issue 1 Symposium - Oil Shale

Article 2

January 1966

Oil Shale: Introduction and Perspective
Joseph G. Lawler

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr

Recommended Citation
Joseph G. Lawler, Oil Shale: Introduction and Perspective, 43 Denv. L.J. 1 (1966).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu.

Denver Law Journal
1966

VOLUME 43

NUMBER

1

Oil Shale: Introduction and Perspective
There appears to be no question that the potential value of
Colorado's untapped oil shale reserves represents a "bonanza" far
in excess of the wildest dreams of the old gold rush prospectors,
dwarfing the uranium boom of the 1950's.' Whether efforts to
develop these vast deposits will succeed in opening a treasure chest
or a Pandora's box depends substantially upon the manner in which
the Federal Government evolves policy for the orderly development
of oil shale reserves. The American citizen is the major stockholder;
his Government owns an estimated 72 per cent of the oil shale lands
of the Green River formation' - which contains almost ten times
the known oil shale reserves in all the rest of the world? These
lands are the richest, too, carrying perhaps 900 billion gallons of
oil in deposits rated upward from 15 gallons per ton.' Little wonder,
then, about the rekindled interest in finding ways and means of
converting this vast treasure into productive wealth.
Despite the current swelling of interest in oil shale, oil from
shale deposits has been produced commercially for more than a
century, principally in oil-short Europe.' After a brief period of
production in the period immediately preceding the Civil War, the
infant United States oil shale industry folded upon discovery of the
major petroleum deposits in Pennsylvania.6 The ease with which
new deposits of petroleum were found and put into production
caused interest in the relatively high-cost oil shale to diminish. 7
Only in recent years have the oil industry and the Federal Government stepped up research efforts to a significant degree.8
'A

national petroleum trade publication computes the value of recoverable oil in the
shale deposits of the Green River Formation at $2,577,000,000,000 (OIL AND GAS
JOURNAL, March 9, 1964, p. 65) [hereinafter cited as OIL AND GAS JOURNAL].

2 Childs, The Status of the Oil Shale Problem, QUARTERLY OF THE COLORADO SCHOOL
OF MINES, July 1965, p. 2.
3U.S. BUREAU OF MINES, BULL. No. 611, OIL SHALE MINING, RIFLE, COLO., 1944-56.

Table 2, p.

4

(1964).

4 Childs, supra note 2 at 1.
5U.S. BUREAU OF MINES, BULL. No. 611, supra note 3 at 4.
6

Ibid.

7 OIL AND GAS JOURNAL,
8

Ibid.

p.

33.
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I. TECHNOLOGY

A major impediment to production of oil in commercial quantities from shale has been the cost of extracting oil from the tough
matrix-like rock in which it is contained." Because of its peculiar
chemical properties the solid hydrocarbon - kerogen - must be
separated from the marlstone, of which it is a part, by application
of heat. At 800 to 900 degrees the kerogen decomposes into a liquid
oil similar to petroleum crude, leaving about 25 per cent in a solid
0
state similar to coke."
The liquid itself is a highly viscous oil which is a slushy solid
at room temperature, and has a pour point of between 90 and 100
degrees F. Thus it must be partially refined before it can be transported by pipeline."
The ore may be mined by conventional means, crushed and
retorted on the surface. A plant having a capacity of 40,000 barrels
of oil per day is considered the minimum for economic success; 2
such a plant would represent, including mining development costs
and a share of research expenditures, a capital outlay of approximately $100,000,000 - this before realizing a cent from production. 3 And in the absence of a Federal policy directed toward
oil shale, only the conventional mining depletion rate of 15 per cent
is available, compared with a 27 per cent depletion rate for crude
oil. 4 Further, the status of shale oil with respect to a refiner's import
quota has not been determined, and if no credit is given the shale
oil must absorb a price penalty proportionate to the reduction of the
refiner's import quota. 5
Despite these factors, industry spokesmen think shale oil can
now be produced as cheaply as the average barrel of crude, and one
trade publication has indicated a 1970 date as most realistic for
"on stream" commercial production.'
II. LAND STATUS

The status of oil shale lands adds to the complexity of the
picture. The Green River formation comprises some 896,000 acres
in Colorado, 2,700,000 acres in Utah, and 460,000 acres in Wyo9
Id. at 79.
10 Lekas & Carpenter, Fracturing Oil Shale With Nuclear Explosives for In-Situ Retorting, QUARTERLY OF THE COLORADO SCHOOL OF MINES, July 1965, p. 21.
11 OL ND GAS JOURNAL, p. 71.
1
2 Id. at 69.
13 Id. at 80.
1
4 Id. at 76.
15
Id. at 80.

16 Id. at 65.
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ming. 7 In 1914 the lands were open to homesteading with mineral
rights reserved," and six years later the lands were made subject
to the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920." President Hoover in 1930
withdrew the classified oil shale lands from entry on a "temporary"
basis for the purpose of "investigation, examination, and classification." 0 It is of interest to note that during the 10-year period
between the effective date of the Mineral Leasing Act and the executive order withdrawing lands from location no leases were issued.2'
Meanwhile, in 1916 and 1924 three large tracts of land in Utah and
Colorado were withdrawn from entry as a future source of oil for
the Navy;' the Colorado tracts comprise 38,700 acres with an estimated content of 5 billion barrels of oil in deposits rating 25 gallons
per ton." Further, under terms of the Multiple Mineral Development Act of 1954, certain of the lands in the oil shale area have
been opened to location for conventional petroleum exploration.
Thus the picture of land status is mottled. Basically, homestead entries made prior to July 17, 1914, carry with them mineral
rights; subsequent to that date mineral rights for homestead lands
are retained by the Federal Government. Patents issued prior to
November 11, 1920, are generally considered unassailable.' Placer
mining claims made prior to that date are open to question; some
have been patented in subsequent years.2"
Following the decline of the early oil shale boom in 1926,
many of the estimated 30,000 claims were abandoned. 7 A series
of contest actions initiated by the Federal Government resulted in
declarations that claims were void for failure to perform requisite
annual development work.' But in 1935 the Supreme Court resolved
the question by holding that the requirement for annual work did
not apply to oil shale claims.2" Then, in a significant holding in
17 U.S. BUREAU OF MINES, BULL. No. 611, supra note 3 at 14.
18 38 Stat. 509 (1915), 30 U.S.C. § 122 (1942).
1941 Stat. 437 (1921), 30 U.S.C. § 22 (1942).
2

0 Exec. Order No. 5327, April 15, 1930.

21 U.S. BUREAU OF MINES, BULL. No. 611, supra note 3 at 15.
22

Ibid.
2 PRIEN, Oil Shale in MINERAL RESOURCES OF COLORADO, 452 (1960).
2468 Stat. 711 (1954), 30 U.S.C. § 527 (1942)'.
25United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 209 U.S. 447 (1907).
26 Records of the Colorado Land Office, U.S. Bureau of Land Management, indicate

269 oil shale patents covering 1,750 claims have been issued in the last 45 years.
See Meek, Records, Documents, and Service of the Colorado Land Office, Bureau of
Land Management, this edition, infra, p. 85.
27 Meek, supra note 26 at 85.
2 See Lohr, Conclusiveness of United States Oil Shale Placer Mining Claim Patents,
this edition, infra, pp. 35-37.
2
9Ickes v. Virginia-Colorado Dev. Corp., 295 U.S. 639 (1935).
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1964, the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior held that the
1935 Supreme Court decision did not apply retroactively to claims
voided prior to that date by departmental action." Even though the
Department might have been in error, he said, cancellations which
were neither appealed from nor attacked over a period of 25 years
could not now be reopened to inquiry, being barred by "the principles
of res judicata, finality of administrative action, and laches."'" With
millions of dollars potentially at stake, it is undoubted that final
determination of the question must await completion of the lengthy
process of appeal through the Federal courts. Further, the unsettled
circumstances have raised questions as to the conclusiveness of all
patents issued since 1920. And of an estimated 30,000 claims
recorded in the Colorado office of the Bureau of Land Management,
nearly one-fourth are still considered representative of "administrative problems" to the Land Office. 2
III.

ECONOMIC FACTORS

The status of the land itself is but one of the problems encountered in analyzing prospects for oil shale development. The effects
of a burgeoning oil shale industry upon the economy of the state,
nation, and world must also be considered.
If ore carrying 10 gallons per ton is considered, the Green
River formation contains at least 2 trillion barrels of oil, or 25 times
the amount of oil produced to date from all sources by the United
States.3 An "open door" policy toward oil shale would cause
enormous dislocation of the oil industry as now constituted. The
regulation of oil imports by the United States maintains a fine
balance predicated upon consideration of domestic production,
exploration, and development; maintenance of adequate domestic
reserves for national defense purposes; conservation of resources;
dollar balances involving oil-producing nations; competition with
the Communist bloc for economic and political considerations
abroad; policy toward research and development of other fuel
sources, i.e., tar sands and atomic energy.
Domestic economic implications are equally complicated. There
is enough oil in Green River shales to constitute 189 East Texas
oil fields, enough potential wealth to pay off the national debt with
$11,000 left over for every man, woman, and child in the United
30

32

Union Oil Co., 71 Interior Dec. 169 (1964).
Id. at 185.
Meek, supra note 26 at 85.

33

Childs, supra note 2 at 1.

31
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States." A continued increase in the cost of finding crude could
shift substantial attention to shale oil; revision of depletion allowances to favor shale oil could have a similar effect. Yet a major
crude oil find discovered subsequent to multi-million dollar commitments by the oil industry to shale operations could burst the
bubble overnight. 5
IV.

WATER PROBLEMS

A thriving oil shale industry will require vast quantities of
water, not only for the anticipated metropolitan area of 340,000
persons envisioned by one researcher for western Colorado," but
also for the refining process essential prior to pipeline transportation of the oil. Thus provision must be made for the acquisition
of water in quantities estimated at up to 455,000 acre feet per year.
It is not at all certain that oil shale industry representatives are fully
aware of the legal complexities surrounding acquisition, diversion,
and retention of water rights. It is disconcerting, for example, to
hear an industry expert dismiss the question of water rights as being
a simple market place transaction whereby "some of the poorer
farms which are now using water will be purchased, and water from
them will be stored and used for oil shale processing and the related
communities.""8 While water may become available to the extent
that it is needed, as need increases so does price. Reliance upon
purchase of existing irrigation rights to supply projected oil shale
requirements could well price the industry out of existence.
In view of the interest of the Federal Government in the orderly
exploitation of oil shale reserves, the problem of water allocation
could be solved by the Secretary of the Interior, who serves both
as master of the Colorado River Basin by Supreme Court edict,39
and as custodian of the public lands held in trust for the American
people. Coordination of these two aspects of the Department of the
Interior's responsibilities through initiation of planning for capture
and retention of now-surplus flood waters has been advocated as
one means of insuring adequate water for oil shale at a reasonable
price. 0
34

OIL AND GAS JOURNAL, p.

65.

35 Ibid.
36 PRIEN, op.

cit. supra note 23 at 458.

37 Colorado Conference Committee,
Sept. 24, 1953.
38

Ertl, Mining Colorado Oil Shale,
July 1965, p. 83, 90.

Water Requirements of an Oil Shale Industry,
QUARTERLY OF THE COLORADO SCHOOL OF MINES,

3

9 Arizona v. Colorado, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).

40 Delaney, Water for Oil Shale Development, this edition, infra, at p. 75.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL
V.

VOL. 43

CONSERVATION

Conservation problems go a lot deeper than just tidying up the
landscape after the mining operation. Certain of the deposits may
be amenable to strip mining, but others are topped with hundreds
of feet of overburden and range up to 1,500 feet in depth. A unique
property of the mineral and the retorting process results in an
expansion of the shale so that spent shale occupies about two-thirds
more volume than does the marlstone ore. A 40,000 barrel per day
plant thus would be required to dispose of 62,000 cubic yards of
spent shale from the 37,000 yards of raw shale it uses each day.4'
Where to put the mountainous debris and then what to do with it
is something more than an inconsequential problem.
Oil shale need not be mined; experiments have been conducted
to determine feasibility of extracting the liquid product from the
ground by application of heat through steam, by controlled burning
(fire flooding), and by use of nuclear explosions to make a vast
retort of the ore body itself. Researchers are divided on the effectiveness of the "in situ" process, but the nature of the method indicates
built-in problems. It seems agreed that the process is less efficient,
thus an ore body decomposed by in situ retorting is likely to produce
less oil than an identical body conventionally mined and retorted
above ground.' Ramifications of a process which will recover only
a portion of the kerogen in place raise serious questions related to
conservation of resources.
Although theoretical studies have been made under auspices of
the Atomic Energy Commission and the U.S. Bureau of Mines aimed
at developing a commercially feasible means of using nuclear explosions for oil shale retorting, field experimentation must await
results of the current research and experimentation before being
given serious consideration, although the subject has some conservation-minded groups worried.
Conservationists, too, are concerned about effects of an oil
shale industry takeover of irrigation rights to farmlands, and see
as the consequences of such a takeover a return of fertile fields to
arid semi-desert land with a concurrent diminution of wildlife.
The prospect of a return flow of 165,000 acre feet of water per year
from a prospering oil shale industry" raises further worries about
contamination of downstream domestic water and of fishing waters
and waterfowl rookeries.
41 OIL AND GAS JOURNAL, p. 69.
42 Ibid.: yield from one mechanical retorting process is reported as approaching 100
per cent.
43 Delaney, supra note 40 at 74.
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VI. A FEDERAL POLICY
Formulation of federal policy toward oil shale is replete with
pitfalls. Since the rekindling of interest in oil shale following World
War II, the Department of the Interior has moved sporadically
toward evolving a policy through intradepartmental studies and
committees," the efforts of the President's Materials Policy Commission" and, most recently, the Oil Shale Advisory Board.4" And
in the absence of affirmative action by the Department, rustlings
have been heard from Congress about legislating an answer. 7 It is
not without justification that oil shale industry leaders accuse the
Department of moving with leaden feet; the Department's Solicitor,
speaking at an oil shale symposium April 23, 1965, in Denver,
reminded his listeners: "There is enough oil in 10-gallon shale for
368 years ....

It would be presumptuous for us to attempt to solve

the problems people may have 368 years from now. We owe it to
future generations to pass along some of the good things on this
planet. We owe it to ourselves to pass along some of its problems.."48
There is much to be said for a "go-slow" attitude on the part
of the Federal Government, however. Until the force of an oil shale
industry's impact upon the economy can be predicted with some
reasonable basis of assurance, a green light for development of shale
lands might prove disastrous. There seems to be good basis for
expecting a federal policy to evolve on a cautious basis designed
to keep oil shale in the position of supplementing conventional
petroleum resources, rather than competing directly with them.
In seeking a method of leasing oil shale lands, federal officials
are caught on the horns of a dilemma. To permit only a few
companies to obtain leases could well bring down charges of favoritism, while opening the doors wide could result in a wild scramble
and consequent disorganized development. The great capital cost
of developing a mine and retorting facility supports the argument
that leases should be restricted to companies which are financially
able to proceed immediately into production. Further, an open policy
" Mock, The Oil Shale Advisory Board, this edition, inIra at 48.
45 Ibid.

4Ibid.
47 Most recently, Senator Douglas of Illinois introduced a measure (S. 2708, 8)th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1965)) providing that upon opening of federal lands to leasing
the Federal Government would retain a one-eighth royalty, proceeds of which would
be allocated to reducing the national debt. The proposal has been attacked by Sen.
Wallace F. Bennett of Utah as "unrealistic and another example of Easterners telling
us how to handle our natural resouces in the West." (Rocky Mountain News,
Nov. 3, 1965, p. 24, col. 3.)
48 Barry, A National Policy for Oil Shale, QUARTERLY OF THE COLORADO SCHOOL OF
MINES, July 1965, p. 97, 105.
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of competitive bidding would encourage speculation in what may
very well be the nation's most valuable untapped natural resource.
Advocates of an open-door policy on oil shale lands include
not only the holders of extensive tracts of oil shale lands, but also
state officialdom, particularly in states with extensive deposits,
industrial development agencies, such as chambers of commerce, and
a cadre of congressional members including some who look to
federal oil shale holdings as the key to paying off the national debt.
How many of the problems are resolved today and how many
are passed on to future generations will depend to a great extent
upon how effectively the Department of the Interior, the Congress,
and the oil shale industry itself cooperate in seeking to devise a
means of meeting and overcoming the technological, economic,
legal, political, esthetic, and international complexities which now
stand between the immense wealth in the ground and its unrealized
fruition.
In this Oil Shale Symposium edition of the Denver Law Journal
the editors do not propose to provide a comprehensive analysis of
the legal problems confronting the oil shale industry. To attempt
to so would be far beyond the resources and capacities of the Journal
in view of the immense complexities of the current picture. The
purpose is, rather, to provide a broad general view, touching in
greater detail upon issues related to validity of claims and patents,
acquisition and retention of water rights, factors involved in formulation of a federal policy, and upon some of the tools available to
the practitioner who might have occasion to inquire into title
questions.
Joseph G. Lawler, Symposium Editor

